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Abstract
Macroeconomic e¤ects of ownership structure in OECD countries
The paper investigates the impact of ownership concentration on GDP
growth, for a sample of 18 OECD countries over the period 1980 to 2004. The
econometric analysis shows that more concentrated ownership can speed up
growth, for countries approaching the technological frontier, provided that
labour market regulation is su¢ ciently tight. In the absence of employment
regulation, the logic of nancial markets discipline applies and dispersed
ownership appears as more favorable for growth. Based on econometric
results, impact coe¢ cients are calculated allowing to evaluate the growth
points gained/lost following a given change in ownership concentration. This
exercise reveals that a reform in the domain of ownership structure can yield
sizeable e¤ects in terms of growth. Importantly, these e¤ects are unequally
distributed across countries: Anglo-Saxon countries would take more ad-
vantage of deregulation (i.e. increased dispersion of ownership in a context
of deregulated labour markets) while continental European countries would
benet more from increased concentration of ownership in a context of re-
inforced labour regulation.
JEL Classication: O43, O57, G32, K31
Key words: ownership concentration, labour market regulation, growth,
developed countries
1 Introduction
This paper shades light on the macroeconomic consequences of rmsown-
ership structures. The importance of ownership structure with respect to
macroeconomic performance has been acknowledged since the inuential
contributions by La Porta et al. [1998] and [1999] as well as, more recently,
Djankov et al. [2006]. These authors investigate the e¤ects of ownership in
large sample of developing/developed countries and underline the possible
emergence of perverse political economy mechanisms leading powerful own-
ers to ensure their interest by countering (at the political level) the nancial
development of a country. Hence, concentrated ownership would lead to
underdevelopment traps with immature nancial markets and weak growth
(see also Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung , 2005).
This result relies on a standard distinction made within the corporate
governance literature1 between two alternative models of governance: the
"insider" model (based on stable concentrated ownership) and the "outsider"
model - based on dispersed ownership. Part of the literature identies the
Anglo-Saxon (outsider) corporate governance model as the most performing
one, in particular during the last decade. However, some authors insist on
the fact that each model of corporate governance has its own strengths and
weaknesses (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
In fact, recent contributions in law and economics suggest that the im-
pact of ownership structure indeed depends on "contexts". In particular,
marketsregulation provides a crucial environment to assess the e¤ects of
di¤erent structures of ownership. More specically, a link would exist be-
tween ownership structure and employment relations because stable, con-
centrated ownership contributes, together with labour market regulation, to
foster long-term partnerships with crucial categories of stake-holders (Blair,
2003; Deakin et al., 2002; Rebérioux, 2002). A similar argument is devel-
oped within the approach in terms of "varieties of capitalism". This liter-
ature suggests that corporate governance models are embedded into larger
institutional frameworks (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Stable institutional
arrangements contribute to foster cooperation among actors within corpo-
rations (shareholders as well as stakeholders): cooperation allows to achieve
1Becht and Mayer, 2001; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Gugler et al., 2004; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997.
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better economic performance, by favouring specic investments by/on stake-
holders as well as long-term projects by corporate managers (Deakin et al.,
2002; Hall and Soskice, 2001).
In a similar vein, contributions in political economy and political eco-
nomics indicate that ownership and markets regulations should be seen as
joint results of a political process. Pagano and Volpin (2005) highlight two
possible political equilibriums emerging out of a political compromise be-
tween employees and managers: a "corporatist" equilibrium achieved by
exchanging larger independence for managers against stronger employment
protection, and an Anglo-Saxon equilibrium characterized by strong share-
holders protection and weak job security. Baker and Rueda [2007] describe
"the situation prevailing in the golden age of social democracy" as the re-
sult of a de facto coalition between "insider capital" and "insider labor":
this coalition allows insider actors to extract rents from outsider actors, and
redistribute the benet of these rents among insiders. Hence, the insider
model of corporate governance would require not only concentrated owner-
ship, but also stable labour relations. On the contrary, the outsider model
would be based on more dispersed ownership and exible labour relations.
Turning to the empirical evidence, a growing stream of literature in-
vestigates the macroeconomic impact of marketsregulation within OECD
countries. This literature points to the need for deregulation on product,
labour and nancial markets in order to speed up growth, particularly when
a country is approaching the "technological frontier" (Aghion, 2006; Conway
et al., 2006; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2007). Acemoglu
et al. [2007] suggest that increased regulation more "e¤ectively" reduces in-
centives to innovate in countries/sectors close to the technological frontier.
However, a few recent contributions cast some doubt on the robustness of
these results (Amable, Demmou and Ladezma, 2007). Unfortunately, all
studies above overlook the role of ownership structure.
This paper aims to ll the gap and empirically assess the joint e¤ects of
ownership structure and labour marketsregulation on GDP per employee
growth, for a sample of 18 OECD countries, over the period 1980-2004. In
the next section, I explore the main theoretical channels through which own-
ership concentration can inuence growth, and also present some descrip-
tive evidence about the linkages between ownership concentration, labour
market regulation and GDP per employee growth. In section 3, the econo-
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metric framework is proposed and evidence is presented by testing a growth
equation on macroeconomic data for 18 OECD countries. In section 4, the
estimated model is used to calculate impact coe¢ cients for ownership con-
centration on growth; results from simulations are discussed providing some
hints on the e¤ects of di¤erent scenarios of structural reforms. Section 5
briey concludes.
2 Ownership structure: a macroeconomic approach
In this section, I present the main theoretical channels through which owner-
ship structure may inuence GDP per employee growth. I subsequently turn
to the descriptive evidence concerning the e¤ects of ownership structure, by
exploiting a dataset of 18 OECD countries over the period 1980-2004.
2.1 theoretical channels
In their inuential contributions, La Porta et al. [1998] and [1999] as well as
Djankov et al. [2006] develop a framework to assess the impact of ownership
structure on growth, based on the logic of nancial markets development
and discipline. The authors adhere, in particular, to the idea that a single
"best solution" exists to the agency problem between managers and own-
ers: a system of dispersed ownership (linked to highly developed nancial
markets) coupled with strong legal protection of shareholders. The reasons
why this system would favor growth are two-fold. First, while owners are
prevented to exert strong direct control because they own small shares of
public companies, managers are exposed to exit and/or takeover threats;
this market discipline ensures that managers will "do the right thing" to
maximize the company value. Second, dispersed ownership prevent owners
to become too powerful and divert wealth according to their own private
interest; this allows to avoid perverse political economy scenarios, such as
powerful elites countering the nancial development of a country, at the
political level. To sum up, this situation is expected to yield an e¢ cient
allocation of investments, and positive e¤ects on growth.
A few critics can be raised against these conclusions. First of all, the
e¤ects of concentrated ownership are probably very di¤erent according to
a country level of development. If one focuses on developed countries, it
appears that the structure of ownership primarily has to "t" production
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needs: in specic sectors, concentrated ownership may well be benecial to
production, by favoring cooperation, economic stability and specic invest-
ments (Carlin and Mayer, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Moreover, tight
nancial markets discipline also yields a bias in strategic investments, by
leading to excessive short-term maximization of rmsmarket value (Blair,
2003).
The literature has explored possible alternatives to nancial markets
discipline and "shareholders models". In particular, scholars have recently
turned to the so called "stakeholders model" within which stakeholders,
and in particular employees, are seen as actors making specic investments
and thus improving their companys capital stock and value. However, for
specic investment to emerge, e¤ective incentives must be in place: stable
partnerships appear as a possible device to protect investors. Stable part-
nerships can be enforced through law and regulation, as well as through a
greater concentration of ownership (Blair, 2003; Deakin et al., 2002). Hence,
ownership concentration and markets regulation both appear to be ingredi-
ents of a stakeholder model of governance, thus favouring growth through
investments in rm specic assets such as human and physical capital.
A related argument is explored by Kharroubi [2006] who studies the ef-
fects of markets regulation on technology and growth. The model shows that
markets regulation pushes rms to invest in more productive technologies
through a two-fold incentive mechanism: rst, upgrading capital allows rms
to make their "almost-xed" labour stock more e¢ cient; second, whenever
technological investments are successful, they generate higher cash-ows al-
lowing to ease liquidity constraints. Hence, markets regulation may generate
positive macroeconomic e¤ects in terms of growth.
Finally, ownership concentration and markets regulation are frequently
associated with the emergence of economic and/or political "elites". It
should be noted that, in the presence of externalities and market failures,
elites can e¤ectively improve coordination across economic actors and fa-
vor industrial modernization (Amable and Hancké, 2001). This mechanism
bears important consequences for innovation and growth: business coordi-
nation (through elites, connected ownership and networks) allows rms to
better account for externalities stemming from education and innovation
activities (Gatti, 2000). Hence, corporations embedded in coordinated envi-
ronments are likely to engage in education and research investments bearing
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important externalities, that would otherwise be overlooked by private ac-
tors.
The theoretical arguments briey reviewed above suggest that di¤erent
structures of ownership may yield contrasted e¤ects on growth. In partic-
ular, the "context" (i.e. markets regulation) plays a crucial role: in the
presence of tightly regulated markets, ownership concentration creates in-
centives for corporate stakeholders to bear substantive e¤orts in specic in-
vestments; on the other hand, deregulated markets and dispersed ownership
enforce market discipline as a device preventing costly ine¢ ciencies.
The issue is therefore primarily empirical. I now turn to present the
descriptive empirical evidence drawn on a sample of OECD countries over
the period 1980 to 2004.
2.2 what do data suggest?
The empirical analysis relies on a sample of 18 OECD countries2 over the
period 1980 to 2004. The sample includes a number of variables captur-
ing the institutional, regulatory, political and macroeconomic features of all
countries. These variables are presented and commented in the Appendix.
In this Section, I will focus on three main variables in my analysis: macro-
economic performance, ownership structure and labour market regulation.
In order to capture macroeconomic performance, I rely on data about
GDP per employee (both in level and in growth rate); these data are drawn
from OECD as well as Penn World Table.
Concerning the structure of ownership, no OECD or World Bank stan-
dards exist in the area. One can alternatively exploit measures of e¤ective
ownership concentration or rely on indirect measures of legal environment
(shareholders protection, for instance). Because my main focus is about
capturing the overall stability of ownership, I rely on data measuring e¤ec-
tive ownership concentration (OC indicator). Very few data are available
for large scale cross-country analyses. A suitable indicator is provided by
La Porta et al. [1998], [1999] and Djankov et al. [2006]. However, only one
single observation in time is available:3 concentration is measured as the
2Those countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom, United States
3Kho et al. [2006] propose an indicator of ownership concentration based on Worldscope
data, available for two points in time (1994 and 2004). However, the authors themselves
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"average percentage of common shares owned by the top three shareholders
in the ten largest non-nancial, privately-owned domestic rms in a given
country. A rm is considered privately-owned if the State is not a known
shareholder in it".
Finally, turning to regulation on labour markets (EPL indicator), this is
captured through the time-series indicator provided by Amable, Demmou
and Gatti [2007]. This measure is obtained by interpolating the standard
OECD indicator, on the basis of information collected through the FRDB
Social Reforms Database4. FRDB database provides detailed records about
social reforms in European countries in the areas of employment protec-
tion legislation, over the period 1985-2005. The specic procedure used to
construct the EPL series is fully described by Amable, Demmou and Gatti
[2007].
Let us now have a rst look at the data and, in particular, to the de-
scriptive evidence about levels of regulation and concentration, as well as
their e¤ects on growth.
Figure 1 below presents EPL and OC indicators for all countries included
in the sample (vertical and horizontal red lines represent sample mean of each
variable). The average country values of EPL is depicted against the single
available country values of ownership concentration. As the gure shows,
countries in the sample are distributed across di¤erent levels of labour mar-
kets regulation and ownership concentration. However, a positive correlation
appears between the two indicators of labour markets regulation and own-
ership concentration. The picture also highlights countries for which both
OC and EPL are above (below) the sample mean value (sample means are
indicated by brown lines). An important number of countries appear to be
characterized by either high or low levels of both OC and EPL: as expected,
Anglo-Saxon countries share low concentration and low regulation; while
South European countries as well as Germany, Belgium and Austria feature
high concentration and high regulation. However, several countries lie be-
tween these two groups, in particular North European countries as well as
France, Ireland and Canada.
point to several weaknesses of these data, in particular the fact that Worldscope rms
population is very heterogenous (in size and composition) across countries and unstable
over time (it has actually been increasing over time).
4The FRDB Social Reforms Database has been developed by the Fondazione Rodolfo
Debenedetti (http://www.frdb.org).
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Figure 1. OC and EPL in sample countries
I now turn to the question of the relation between OC and GDP per
employee growth. Figures 2 below allows to get a rst impression about
the e¤ects of ownership concentration on growth. In this gure, average
country growth rates of GDP per employee are drawn against OC. In the
gure, I have highlighted countries experiencing average growth rates (over
the whole period)) that are higher than the sample mean. As one can see,
those countries are fairly distributed across di¤erent levels of concentration
and regulation. In particular, there does not seem to be any clear negative
relationship between concentration, regulation and growth. An important
subset of countries (among which Germany and North European countries)
have experienced fast growth rates in spite of high levels of concentration
and/or regulation.
The descriptive evidence suggests that, within the sample and period
considered, there is a positive relationship between levels of regulation and
concentration. Moreover, fast growth does not appear to be the matter
of low regulation/low concentration countries, but rather distributed across
countries also showing high values of EPL and/or OC. To investigate more
deeply the correlations between ownership, regulation and growth, let us
now turn to the econometric analysis.
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3 Econometric analysis
In this section, I develop an econometric analysis based on a standard growth
equation. After presenting the empirical model to be tested, I briey discuss
the methodological issues related to estimations. Econometric results are
then presented and their robustness checked in particular with respect to
endogeneity issues.
3.1 empirical model
We have seen that recent contributions on the determinants of growth focus
on the consequences of markets regulations on innovation: according to sev-
eral authors,5 regulation a¤ects innovation and growth di¤erently according
to a countrys distance with respect to the technological (or production)
frontier. This assumption implies that the macroeconomic consequences of
regulation depend on contexts, i.e. on the level of development and wealth.
This assumption is certainly fair. However, a crucial question rises con-
cerning the direction of the e¤ects of regulation on growth, when countries
5Aghion [2006], Conway et al. [2006], Nicoletti and Scarpetta [2003], Acemoglu, Aghion
and Zilibotti [2007].
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get closer to the frontier. The standard argument is that countries get more
and more harmed by markets regulation as they get closer to the frontier.
However, the theoretical issues and empirical evidence presented in the pre-
vious section suggest that countries may indeed prot more from stricter
regulation and ownership concentration when they approach the technolog-
ical frontier: stronger incentives to invest in up-to-date technologies, higher
productive e¤ort and implication by workers, a better perception of exter-
nalities linked to innovation could be crucial advantages to gain/consolidate
a leadership position.
To tackle this issue, I estimate the joint e¤ects of labour markets reg-
ulation and ownership concentration on growth, by using OECD data on
18 developed countries over the period 1980-2004. The estimated model
includes regulation and ownership indicators, macroeconomic controls, the
e¤ects of externalities from leader countries as well as a measure of indi-
vidual countriesdistance with respect to the technological frontier (see, in
particular, Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003):
 ln yi;t = i + 1  ln yFt + 1 Xi;t + 2  Yi;t + 3  Educi;t +
+1  oci;t + 2  epli;t + 3  oci;t  epli;t + (1)
+4  dfi;t  oci;t + 5  dfi;t  epli;t + i;t
i = individual country xed e¤ect, yi;t = GDP per employee,  ln yi;t =
growth rate (di¤erence between logGDP at the end and at the beginning
of period t), yFt = GDP per employee of frontier country at time t (the
frontier country is the country which has the highest GDP per employee
level at period t), dfi;t =   ln yi;tyFt = country i distance with respect to the
frontier at time t (the closer the country is to frontier the smaller the value
of di;t with 0 5 dfi;t 5 1). Moreover, Educi;t = a proxy for human capital in
country i at time t, Yi;t = vector of macroeconomic controls, Xi;t = vector
of markets regulation variables, epli;t = employment protection legislation,
oci;t = ownership concentration.
In order to properly estimate (1) one has to solve two methodological
problems: rst, how to treat slowly changing variables (such as indicators for
regulation and ownership concentration) within a xed e¤ects model; second,
how to appreciate the overall e¤ects of variables included in interactions
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terms.
Concerning the rst problem, a few variables included in the model (such
as ownership concentration and product market regulation) are invariant or
change very slowly. These variables capture features that characterize a
single country - or a small subset of countries: they are thus very close to
individual country e¤ects. Plümper and Tröger [2007] propose a specic
technique for analyzing the e¤ect of time-invariant variables in xed-e¤ect
models: the FEVD estimator. This procedure takes three steps: (i) estimate
a xed-e¤ects model (ii) regress the unit e¤ects on the time-invariant vari-
ables (iii) re-estimate the rst stage including the error term of the second
stage. The procedure amounts to extracting from the xed e¤ect the part of
it that is explained by slowly changing variables. This allows to give more
sense to xed e¤ects by explicitly modelling their institutional components.
The FEVD estimator appears to be crucial in the present study because
of the specicity of certain indicators, in particular OC wich has no time
prole.
Turning to the second issue, the empirical model (1) includes three in-
teraction terms allowing to capture the idea that the macroeconomic con-
sequences of ownership structure depend on contexts. First, we have seen
that the impact of ownership may vary in response to the degree of regu-
lation on labour markets: this e¤ect is apprehended through an interaction
term between EPL and OC. Second, the consequences of regulation and
ownership may also depend on the countrys distance to the technological
frontier; for this reason, I have included two interaction terms between EPL
(respectively, OC) and countriesdistance to frontier (DF). In the presence
of interaction terms, the overall impact of OC and EPL on growth is ob-
tained by computing the marginal e¤ect conditional on specic values of the
interacted variables (Braumeoller, 2004). From model (1) one has:
@ ln y
@oc
= 1 + 3  epl + 4  df (2)
@ ln y
@epl
= 2 + 3  oc+ 5  df
Hence, the consequences of ownership concentration depend rst, on the
regulatory context (the level of EPL) and second, on the country distance
to frontier (the value of DF). The same reasoning applies to employment
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protection legislation. A specic procedure presented by Amable, Demmou
and Gatti [2007] allows to evaluate the e¤ects of each relevant variable for
di¤erent levels of the interacted variables. This amounts to calculating the
marginal e¤ects of each relevant variable, as well as all statistics about the
signicance of those marginal e¤ects.
3.2 results
I now turn to the analysis of GDP per employees growth. My baseline
model is (1) which includes regulation and ownership indicators, macro-
economic controls and a proxy for human capital (education). My main
focus is on the e¤ects of ownership concentration and employment protec-
tion legislation. However, I also include institutional variables controlling for
other characteristics of product market structure, such as state intervention
(PMR-SI) and the extent of regulation in key-service sectors (REGREFF).
I run regressions using two alternative estimators: the FEVD estimator,
which yields e¢ cient estimations of slowly-changing variables, and two-stage
instrumental variable estimator (XTIVREG2 procedure) which allows to
control for a possible endogeneity of regressors. Invariant variables in FEVD
regressions are: product market regulation-state intervention (PMR-SI) and
ownership concentration (OC).
A growing literature suggests that institutional devices (such as own-
ership concentration and markets regulation) may be endogenous and de-
pend on several concurring processes: feedback from economic performance,
political pressures, legal constraints, path dependence (Amable and Gatti,
2004; Cusack, Iversen and Soskice, 2007; Gatti and Glyn, 2006; Pagano
and Volpin, 2005; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2007). From an empirical
point of view, the question is how to satisfactorily account for endogeneity.
A few recent papers tackle the issue of endogeneity with longitudinal data
for developed and/or developing countries (Amable, Gatti and Schumacher
[2006]; La Porta et al. 1998, 1999; Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silane and
Shleifer 2006) by making use of an instrumental variables (IV) approach. I
adopt the same procedure in this paper and consider the following variables
as endogenous: Distance to frontier, EPL*Distance to frontier, OC*Distance
to frontier, EPL, OC, EPL*OC. The selected instruments for IV estimations
are: lagged endogenous variables, age structure of the population (propor-
tion of elderly people), unionsbargaining power (union density rate), Raes
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index of fractionalization of party system, incidence of protest votes.
Results presented in table below show similar coe¢ cients for the two
alternative estimation procedures. However, it appears to be impossible
to properly account for time-invariant variables (such as OC and PMR-SI)
with the instrumental variable procedure. The OC variable automatically
drops out of regressions (and does not show up in results below), because it
confounds with unit xed e¤ects in rst-stage regressions. On the contrary,
the FEVD procedure allows to cope with this problem by extracting, from
xed e¤ects, the component that is explained by slowly-changing indicators.
Hence, this procedure appears as more appropriate to estimate (1).
As one can see from Table 1, human capital contributes to speed up GDP
per employees growth, while distance to frontier appears to play mostly
through interaction terms. Concerning EPL, OC and PMR-SI all prove
signicant in FEVD regressions, while REGREFF is never signicant. State
intervention yields a positive e¤ect, which can be explained by the role
of state-owned companies in fostering innovation in crucial sectors of the
economy. As suggested in existing economic literature (quoted in Sections
above), the direct e¤ect of EPL and OC on growth is negative.
However, additional information about the overall e¤ects of EPL and OC
needs to be gathered from the analysis of the interaction terms. In fact, all
interaction terms are signicant under FEVD and XTIVREG2 regressions.
As one can see, the interaction between EPL and OC has a positive and
signicant impact on growth: stronger employment protection (respectively,
ownership concentration) favors growth in contexts where OC (respectively,
EPL) levels are higher. This counters the direct negative e¤ects of increased
regulation and concentration. Moreover, results about the two interaction
terms between "distance to frontier", on the one hand, and EPL or OC, on
the other hand, prove that the overall impact of EPL and OC on growth
depends on the country position with respect to the frontier. Given the signs
of the estimated coe¢ cients, the negative impact of OC on growth becomes
smaller when approaching the frontier. Concerning the e¤ect of EPL, the
positive sign of the interaction term shows that the direct negative impact
of EPL is considerably reduced for countries that are far away from the
frontier.
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Table 1
DlogGDP per employee  [1] [2]
DlogFrontier 0.302*** 0.297***
(0.108) ( 0.092)
Distance to frontier 0.119 0.206*
(0.086) ( 0.128)
Effective real exchange rate -0.024* -0.031**
(0.014) (0 .012)
Education 0.061*** 0.078***
(0.015) (0 .023)
EPL*distance to frontier 0.114*** 0.188***
(0.032) (0.042)
OC*distance to frontier -0.409* -0.737**
(0.218) (0.349)
EPL -0.075*** -0.132*
(0.026) (0.069)
EPL*OC 0.154*** 0.272*
(0.053) (0.148)
REGREFF 0.000 0.00
(0.001) (0.00)
OC -0.039***
(0.007)
PMR SI 0.011*** 0.0054
(0.001) (0.004)
eta 1.000***
(0.045)
Estimator XTFEVD XTIVREG2
pcse option gmm option
Time/country dummies Yes Yes
Number of Obs 410 380
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Summary test statistics for IV regression
Anderson Rubin test F(9,343)= 6.28 P-value<1%
Stoch Wright test Chi-sq(9)=41.12 P-value<1%
Hansen J statistic 5.442 P-value>10%
Endogeneity test 17.962 P-value<5%
A more detailed evaluation of the direct/indirect e¤ects of OC and EPL
is reported in the Appendix (Table 2) where I present estimations for all
marginal coe¢ cients. The main implications of these estimation results are
presented in the following section.
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4 Evaluating the impact of ownership concentra-
tion
As shown in Table 1 (rst column), the FEVD procedure provides robust
estimations for time-invariant indicators (OC in particular). Based on such
estimations, it appears that the impact of variable OC on growth depends on
contexts, i.e. on existing regulation and on country "distance to frontier".
More precisely, Table 2 (Appendix) gives all marginal coe¢ cients for
OC (and EPL). This shows that the overall OC coe¢ cients are negative for
low levels of EPL, and become positive for higher levels of EPL (if country
"distance to frontier" ranges from average to very small). Hence, ownership
concentration favors growth when countries get closer to frontier provided
that those countries feature (at least) average levels of employment protec-
tion legislation. The e¤ect becomes stronger the closer a country gets to
frontier.
These results provide an answer to the crucial questions raised in this
paper. First, stronger ownership concentration is not necessarily bad for
growth. Second, leader countries benet more from ownership concentra-
tion in the presence of a strong regulation on the labour market. Hence,
econometric results provide some support to the theoretical arguments sug-
gesting a positive impact of concentration on growth, provided that concen-
trated ownership is embedded into a suitable context (i.e. a highly regulated
environment). I will explore more deeply the issue in Section below.
4.1 overall e¤ects of changes in concentration
I rely hereafter on estimated marginal coe¢ cients reported in Table 2 (Ap-
pendix). These coe¢ cients can be used to build impact coe¢ cients for
variable OC. Impact coe¢ cients measure the growth points gained/lost fol-
lowing a certain increase in ownership concentration. I calculate impact
coe¢ cients for di¤erent reference values of context variables: levels of regu-
lation and country distance to frontier (DF). In particular, I consider three
groups of countries: leadersfor which variable DF goes from minDF up
to meanDF minus one sdDF ; average countriesfor which variable DF is
comprised betweenmeanDF minus one sdDF andmeanDF plus one sdDF ;
and nally, laggards for which variable DF ranges between maxDF and
meanDF plus one sdDF .
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Let me now turn to the analysis of the overall impact of ownership con-
centration on growth. By using coe¢ cients presented in Table 2, I calculate
the growth points gained/lost following a 5 points increase in ownership con-
centration (ex. from 20% to 25% of concentration), provided that estimated
coe¢ cients are statistically signicant. These gains/losses are evaluated for
minimum to maximum country distance to frontier. Results are presented
in Figure 3 below.
-1,5%
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-0,5%
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
Leaders Average Laggards
Max EPL
High EPL
Av EPL
Min EPL
Figure 3. Growth points gained/lost following a 5 points
increase in OC
The picture shows that, for laggards and average countries, the overall
impact of a 5 point increase in ownership concentration is signicant and
negative with low EPL levels, while not signicant when EPL takes aver-
age to maximum levels. For leader countries, it appears that the impact
of increased ownership concentration becomes signicant and positive when
employment regulation ranges from average to maximum levels; in this case,
the overall impact of a 5 points increase in ownership concentration is rel-
atively important for growth as it delivers additional 1-1,3 points of GDP
per employee growth.
One might want to know how would sample countries be a¤ected by such
an increase in ownership concentration. Figure 4 below shows that coun-
tries would respond di¤erently as a consequence of a change in ownership
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structure. If one focuses on countries that are relatively close to the fron-
tier, it appears that Anglo-Saxon countries (and in particular the US and
Canada) lie in an area where one can expect negative e¤ects from increased
OC because of the very low levels of EPL; on the other hand, many Eu-
ropean countries actually lie in an area where they would actually benet
from such increase thanks to the high levels of regulation. This result calls
for futher checks; I will therefore explore more deeply the consequences of
reforms in ownership and regulation, in the following Section.
Increasing OC : which impact in sample countries?
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4.2 policy scenarios
In this Section I present simulations of GDP per employees growth, based
on estimated regression coe¢ cients presented in Table 1 (column [1], FEVD
procedure). Econometric results have provided some support to the idea
that changes in ownership structure are likely to produce di¤erent results
according to contexts, i.e. according to the prevailing level of labour market
regulation and to country distance with respect to the frontier. Hence,
simulations presented below aim to shade some light on the consequences,
for all sample countries, of changes in selected variables, namely ownership
concentration and employment regulation.
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In particular, four policy scenarios are simulated. First, I run a simula-
tion exploring a situation where all countries would have selected levels of
OC and EPL that are lower than actual ones by one standard deviation.
The consequences of this change are shown in Figure 5. As one can see,
this kind of reform would have beneted a few countries in the sample: the
UK, the US, Ireland, Canada and Australia (plus Japan), i.e. primarily
Anglo-Saxon low regulation countries. All other countries, and in particular
European countries, take no advantage, and even experience lower growth,
following such reform.
Second, I simulate the alternative situation where countriespolicy choice
would have been to implement levels of both OC and EPL that are higher
than actual ones by one standard deviation. This change is shown to be
potentially benecial for all countries except the US and the UK (see Figure
6 below). Hence, a progressive increase in regulation and ownership concen-
tration appears as a more suitable policy choice for continental European
countries, as compared to the alternative deregulation policy.
Finally, two more simulations are run to test the alternative scenarios
where EPL and OC would be put equal to their maximum or minimum
sample values. This exercise allows to tentatively evaluate the long-run
implications of reforms aiming at radically changing labour regulation and
ownership structure. The simulations show the "provocative" result that
selecting the highest sample values for OC and EPL would have indeed
always been the best growth-oriented policy for all sample countries (see
Figure 7 below).
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the impact of ownership structure on GDP per
employee growth from a macroeconomic point of view. Contrary to common
wisdom, the theoretical arguments presented in the paper suggest that con-
centrated ownership can in some cases favor growth. In fact, concentrated
ownership tends to increase ownership stability thus fostering long term re-
lationships with crucial stakeholders. In developed countries where (labour)
markets are highly regulated, ownership stability can yield increased in-
centives to undertake rm-specic investments. These investments favor
productivity growth in di¤erent sectors of the economy, and can be crucial
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to achieve and/or maintain technological leadership.
The main contribution of the paper is empirical. I investigated the im-
pact of ownership concentration on growth for a sample of 18 OECD coun-
tries over the period 1980 to 2004. The econometric analysis shows that
the e¤ects of ownership concentration indeed depend on contexts, i.e. on
the regulatory environment and on the country distance to the frontier. In
fact, more concentrated ownership can yield positive e¤ects on growth (in
particular for leader countries) provided that labour market regulation is
su¢ ciently tight. In the absence of employment regulation, the logic of -
nancial markets discipline applies and dispersed ownership appears as more
favorable for growth.
Finally, the paper has provided some hints about the possible e¤ects of
changes in ownership concentration and regulation. Based on economet-
ric results, impact coe¢ cients have been presented allowing to evaluate the
growth points gained/lost following a given change in ownership concen-
tration. This exercise reveals that a reform in the domain of ownership
structure can yield sizeable e¤ects in terms of growth. More important,
these e¤ects are unequally distributed across countries: Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries would take more advantage of deregulation (i.e. increased dispersion
of ownership in a context of deregulated labour markets) while European
countries would benet more from increased concentration of ownership in
a context of reinforced regulation.
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Simulation with OC and EPL equal to real values less 1sd (GDPgrowth_LOW_OC_EPL)
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Simulation with OC and EPL equal to real values plus 1sd (GDPgrowth_HIGH_OC_EPL)
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Simulations with OC and EPL equal to max and min sample values (GDP-
growth_Max_OC_EPL and GDPgrowth_Min_OC_EPL)
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6 Appendix
6.1 data and sources
Product markets regulation is measured through standard OECD indicators
such as PMR and REGREFF: PMR is a global regulation indicators (only
two observations are available), while REGREFF is a time-series indicator
assessing the extent of regulation in key service sectors (such as gas, electric-
ity, transports, etc.). OECD also provide a decomposition of PMR according
to elds of regulation: state intervention, barriers to rmscreation, trade
barriers. The extent of state intervention is a potentially crucial variable
in my analysis because it also captures an important aspect of companies
ownership structure.
Macroeconomic control (such as real e¤ective exchange rate) are drawn
from the OECD annual dataset. Education is measured as the proportion of
enrolled students out of corresponding age-class population (OECD data).
Population data, such as the share of the population aged 65 years and older
(elderly population), are obtained from OECD.
In order to run instrumental variable technique, I rely on several political
indicators from the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2005):
the Raes index of fractionalization of the political party system, the share
of protestvotes (dened as the sum of votes for radical parties and absten-
tion), a dummy for corporatist countries. Moreover, few data are obtained
from M. Paganos online database (www.csef.it/people/pagano_data.htm),
in particular dummy variables for proportional voting systems as well as for
countrieslegal origins (German, common and Scandinavian). Finally, I con-
sider a annual indicator of left/right ideological positioning of governments
elaborated and proposed by Amable, Gatti and Schumacher [2006].
6.2 marginal coe¢ cients
To assess the overall impact of EPL and OC, I calculate marginal e¤ects and
their signicance conditional to ve alternative values of the relevant vari-
ables: minimum and maximum levels, mean value and mean plus/minus one
standard deviation. Results are reported below separately for the marginal
e¤ect of EPL and OC.
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Table 2
Min distance Low distance Average distance High distance Max distance
to frontier to frontier to frontier to frontier to frontier
Marginal effect of EPL
Min OC -0.045*** -0.042** -0.024* -0.006 0.040***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015)
Mean OC less 1sd -0.031** -0.028** -0.010 0.007 0.054***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016)
Mean OC -0.012 -0.009 0.009 0.026*** 0.073***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.020)
Mean OC plus 1sd 0.007 0.011 0.028*** 0.046*** 0.092***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.025)
Max OC 0.017* 0.020** 0.038*** 0.055*** 0.102***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.027)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Marginal effect of OC
Min EPL -0.031*** -0.044*** -0.107** -0.170** -0.338**
(0.010) (0.014) (0.045) (0.078) (0.167)
Mean EPL less 1sd 0.042 0.030 -0.033 -0.097 -0.264
(0.032) (0.033) (0.052) (0.081) (0.166)
Mean EPL 0.128** 0.115* 0.052 -0.011 -0.179
(0.061) (0.061) (0.071) (0.093) (0.171)
Mean EPL plus 1sd 0.213** 0.200** 0.137 0.074 -0.093
(0.090) (0.090) (0.096) (0.112) (0.180)
Max EPL 0.267** 0.255** 0.191* 0.128 -0.039
(0.109) (0.109) (0.113) (0.126) (0.188)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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